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Abstract—Mobile edge computing seeks to provide resources
to different delay-sensitive applications. This is a challenging
problem as an edge cloud-service provider may not have sufficient
resources to satisfy all resource requests. Furthermore, allocating
available resources optimally to different applications is also
challenging. Resource sharing among different edge cloud-service
providers can address the aforementioned limitation as certain
service providers may have resources available that can be
“rented” by other service providers. However, edge cloud service
providers can have different objectives or utilities. Therefore,
there is a need for an efficient and effective mechanism to
share resources among service providers, while considering the
different objectives of various providers. We model resource
sharing as a multi-objective optimization problem and present a
solution framework based on Cooperative Game Theory (CGT).
We consider the strategy where each service provider allocates
resources to its native applications first and shares the remaining
resources with applications from other service providers. We
prove that for a monotonic, non-decreasing utility function, the
game is canonical and convex. Hence, the core is not empty and
the grand coalition is stable. We propose two algorithms Game-
theoretic Pareto optimal allocation (GPOA) and Polyandrous-
Polygamous Matching based Pareto Optimal Allocation (PPMPOA)
that provide allocations from the core. Hence the obtained
allocations are Pareto optimal and the grand coalition of all the
service providers is stable. Experimental results confirm that our
proposed resource sharing framework improves utilities of edge
cloud-service providers and application request satisfaction.
Index Terms—Cooperative game theory, core, edge cloud,
resource allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile edge computing is a viable solution to support
resource intensive applications (users)1 that relies on mobile
edge clouds (MECs) placed at the edge of any network [1].
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1Throughout the paper, we use the terms “applications” and “users”
interchangeably.
This, in contrast with running applications on user devices
(with limited processing capability) or deep in the Internet,
usually allows one-hop communication [2] between edge
clouds and applications in order to provide the required
processing power and reduce application latency. The goal
for any MEC service provider is to provide resources to
applications as much as possible, resulting in an increase in
application satisfaction and utility for the provider. However, a
fundamental limitation of MEC is that in contrast to traditional
cloud platforms and data centers, edge clouds have limited
resources and may not always be able to satisfy application
demands for resources [1]. In addition to commercial settings,
this problem of limited resources also occurs in military
networks. For example, MEC service providers are equivalent
to military coalition partners, who own various parts of the
computing resources.
To address resource scarcity, different solutions have been
proposed in the literature such as purchasing more resources
to meet peak demands, using resources from the same service
provider located at a distant location, or sharing resources
among co-located mobile edge clouds. However, purchasing
more resources to meet peak demands is not an efficient
solution as the newly purchased resources may not always
be used. Furthermore, it is not always possible to accurately
predict peak demand. Hence, delays in purchasing additional
resources may introduce delays in satisfying the applications.
Similarly, using resources of the same provider at a distant
location can increase latency. Creating shared resources among
co-located (or physically adjacent) edge clouds is a promising
approach as it accounts for the aforementioned shortcomings
of buying more resources to meet peak demands or allocat-
ing resources at a distant location. However, resources of
co-located mobile edge clouds belong to different service
providers, each of which may have a particular objective
to optimize such as security, throughput, latency, etc. when
allocating and utilizing its resources. Therefore creating a
resource pool and then allocating these resources requires
taking different service provider objectives into account, which
results in a multi-objective optimization [3] (MOO) problem.
In this paper, we attempt to address these issues. Specifi-
cally, we consider a setting where multiple edge clouds reside
at the network edge belonging to different service providers.
Each MEC has a specific set and amount of resources and
a number of applications affiliated with the MEC demand
for resources. We consider a strategy where all edge clouds
initially allocate resources to their native applications. If an
edge cloud satisfies its own applications and has free resources,
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2it can share them with other edge clouds that might need them.
This is because satisfying native applications helps the MEC
service provider to retain its customers. We present a resource
sharing and allocation framework based on cooperative game
theory (CGT), in which different edge clouds form a coalition
to share their resources and satisfy the requests of different
applications. Our CGT-based framework considers the fact
that different edge clouds may have different objectives, which
makes the traditional single-objective optimization framework
inapplicable to the MEC settings.
A. Summary of the contributions
The main contributions of this paper are:
1) We present a novel multi-objective resource-sharing
problem formulation that considers both service provider
utilities and application request satisfaction in mobile
edge clouds. We propose a cooperative game theory
based framework to solve the formulated problem. We
model each edge cloud service provider as a player in
our game and model resource sharing and allocation
problem as a canonical game with non-transferable
utility (NTU). We prove that the game is super-additive
and convex, hence the core is non-empty. Therefore, the
grand coalition of all edge clouds is stable.
2) We propose a distributed Game-theoretic Pareto Optimal
Allocation (GPOA) algorithm that provides an allocation
from the core based on a strategy where all MECs first
allocate resources to their native applications, and then
MECs with resource surplus share their resources with
those that have a resource deficit.
3) To reduce resource fragmentation2 due to resource
sharing among MECs, we also propose Polyandrous
Polygamous Matching based Pareto Optimal Allocation
(PPMPOA) algorithm that aims to match resource deficit
MECs with resource surplus MECs. Using evaluations
we show that PPMPOA:
• Provides allocation from the core.
• Results in a stable matching [4].
• Reduces resource fragmentation.
4) We also prove that the proposed algorithms, GPOA and
PPMPOA, enforce truth-telling, i.e., no MEC service
provider has the incentive to misreport its capacity and
native application requests.
5) We evaluate the performance of our proposed framework
by extensive simulations. We verify the game theoretic
properties of our proposed approach by showing that
the game is super-additive and the core is nonempty,
i.e., our obtained solutions are from the core and satisfy
properties such as individual rationality, group rational-
ity, and stability. We also show that the resource sharing
and allocation mechanism improves the utilities of game
players. Furthermore, our framework also improves ap-
plication (user) satisfaction.
2We define resource fragmentation as splitting of the provisioned resources
to applications of any player n across different MECs. The higher the number
of MECs that provide resources to a particular application, the higher will be
the resource fragmentation. Ideally, for the applications of a resource deficit
MEC, only one MEC with resource surplus should provide the resources.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
provides a primer on MOO, CGT, and the core. Section III
describes our system model and presents the resource shar-
ing/allocation optimization problem. Section IV discusses the
game theoretic solution and Section V presents our experimen-
tal results. Section VI presents a review of relevant literature,
while Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give a brief overview of Multi-Objective
Optimization (MOO), cooperative game theory, and the core.
A. Multi-Objective Optimization
Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) identifies a vector
x∗ = [x∗1, x
∗
2, · · · , x∗t ]T that optimizes a vector function
f¯(x) = [f1(x), f2(x), · · · , fN (x)]T (1)
such that
gi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m, (2)
hi(x) = 0 i = 1, 2, · · · , p.
where x = [x1, x2, · · · , xt]T is a vector of t decision variables
and the feasible set is denoted by F . The fundamental differ-
ence between a single objective optimization (SOO) and MOO
is that MOO involves a vector of objective functions rather
than a single objective function. Hence, the resulting solution
is not a single point, but a frontier of solutions known as
Pareto frontier or Pareto boundary (see [3] for details). Some
basic definitions related to MOO are:
Definition 1. Pareto Improvement or Pareto Dominated Solu-
tion: Given an initial allocation, if we can achieve a different
allocation that improves at least one individual function with-
out degrading any other, then the initial allocation is called
Pareto improvement.
Definition 2. Pareto Optimality: For any minimization prob-
lem, x∗ is Pareto Optimal if the following holds for every
x ∈ F ,
f¯(x∗) ≤ f¯(x). (3)
where f¯(x∗) = [f1(x∗), f2(x∗), · · · , fN (x∗)]T .
Figure 1 shows a MOO problem with two objective func-
tions f1 and f2. The boundary
←→
ab is the Pareto frontier as it
consists of all the Pareto optimal solutions.
B. Cooperative Game Theory
Cooperative game theory provides a set of analytical tools
that assist in understanding the behavior of rational players in
a cooperative setting [5]. Players can have agreements among
themselves that affect strategies as well as utilities obtained
by the game players. Coalition game, a type of cooperative
game, deals with the formation of coalitions, namely groups
of two or more cooperating players. Formally,
Definition 3. Coalition Game [5]: Any coalition game with
non-transferable utility (discussed below) can be represented
3Fig. 1. MOO with two objective functions
by the pair (N ,V) where N is the set of players that play the
game, while V is a set of payoff vectors such that [6]:
1) V(S),∀S ⊆ N should be a closed and convex subset of
R|N |.
2) V(S) should be comprehensive, i.e., if we are given
payoffs x ∈ V(S) and y ∈ R|S| where y ≤ x, then
y ∈ V(S). In other words, if the members of coalition
S can achieve a payoff allocation x, then the players
can change their strategies to achieve an allocation y
where y ≤ x.
3) The set {x|x ∈ V(S) and xn ≥ zn,∀n ∈ S}, with
zn = max{yn|y ∈ V({n})} ≤ ∞ ∀n ∈ N should be
a bounded subset of R|S|. In other words, the set of
vectors in V(S) for a coalition S where the coalition
members receives a payoff at least as good as working
alone (non-cooperatively) is a bounded set.
Definition 4. Utility: The payoff or gain a player receives in
the game is known as utility.
Definition 5. Value of a coalition: The sum of utilities of the
coalition members is known as the value v of a coalition.
Definition 6. Non-Transferable Utility (NTU) [5]: If the total
utility of any coalition cannot be assigned a single real
number or if there is a rigid restriction on utility distribution
among players, then the game has a non-transferable utility.
In other words, the payoff each player receives and the value
of coalition depend on the game strategy. Utility cannot be
transfered freely among the players.
Definition 7. Characteristic function: The characteristic func-
tion for any coalition game with NTU is a function that assigns
a set of payoff vectors, V(S) ⊆ R|S|, to game players where
each element of the payoff vector xn represents a payoff that
player n ∈ S obtains given a strategy selected by the player
n in the coalition S.
Definition 8. Characteristic Form Coalition Games [5]: A
coalition game is said to be of characteristic form, if the
value of coalition S ⊆ N depends only on the members of
the coalition. (This means that players that are not part of the
game don’t impact the value of coalition.)
Definition 9. Superadditivity of NTU games: A canonical
game with NTU is said to be superadditive if the following
property is satisfied.
{x ∈ RS1∪S2 |(xn)n∈S1 ∈ V(S1), (xm)m∈S2
∈ V(S2)} ⊂ V(S1 ∪ S2) ∀S1 ⊂ N , S2 ⊂ N , S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
(4)
where x is a payoff allocation for the coalition S1 ∪ S2.
That is, if any two disjoint coalitions S1 and S2 form a
large coalition S1 ∪S2, then the coalition S1 ∪S2 can always
give its members the payoff that they would have received in
the disjoint coalition S1 and S2. It is worth mentioning that
V is the set of payoff vectors while v is the sum of payoffs
for all coalition players.
Definition 10. Canonical Game: A coalition game is canon-
ical if it is superadditive and in characteristic form.
The core is a widely used concept for dealing with canonical
games as discussed below.
C. Core
To help us explain the core, we first define some terms [5].
Definition 11. Group Rational: A payoff vector x ∈ RN for
distributing the coalition value v(N ) to all players is group-
rational if
∑
n∈N xn = v(N ).
Definition 12. Individual Rational: A payoff vector x ∈ RN is
individually rational if every player can obtain a payoff no less
than acting alone (not in a coalition), i.e., xn ≥ v({n}),∀n ∈
N .
Definition 13. Imputation: A payoff vector that is both indi-
vidual and group rational is an imputation.
Definition 14. Grand Coalition: The coalition formed by all
game players N is the grand coalition.
Based on the above definitions, we can define the core of
an NTU canonical coalition game as:
Definition 15. Core [5]: For any NTU canonical game
(N ,V), the core CNTU is the set of imputations in which
no coalition S ⊂ N has any incentive to reject the proposed
payoff allocation and deviate from the grand coalition to form
the smaller coalition S instead. Mathematically, this is
CNTU = {x ∈ V(N )|∀S ⊂ N ,@y ∈ V(S) such that yn > xn,
∀n ∈ S}. (5)
Remark 1. Any payoff allocation from the core is Pareto-
optimal as evident from definition of the core. Furthermore, the
grand coalition formed is stable, i.e., no two players will have
an incentive to leave the grand coalition to form a smaller
coalition.
However, the core is not always guaranteed to be non-empty.
If the core is non-empty, it will be a convex set [7], whereas
a convex set consists of infinite convex combinations of the
points within the set [8]. Therefore, a non-empty core is large
and finding a payoff allocation (vector) in the core is not easy.
4Fig. 2. Our system model with multiple MEC providers
Definition 16. User/Application Request Satisfaction: The
extent to which a request for resources is satisfied. Mathemat-
ically, if r is the requested amount and x is the provisioned
amount, then application request satisfaction is given by x/r.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Let N = {1, 2, · · · , N} be the set of edge cloud-service
providers. We assume that each service provider has a set
of K = {1, 2, · · · ,K} different types of resources such
as communication, computation and storage resources. Let
the available resources at service provider n be denoted
by Cn = {Cn,1, · · · , Cn,K}, where Cn,k is the amount
of type k resources available at service provider n. Each
service provider n has a set of native (local) applications
Mn = {1, 2, · · · ,Mn}. The set of all applications that ask for
resources from all service providers (i.e., the grand coalition
of service providers) is given by M =M1 ∪M2 · · · ∪MN ,
where Mi ∩ Mj = ∅, ∀i 6= j, i.e., each provider has an
entirely different set of native applications. Every provider
n ∈ N has a request (requirement) matrix Rn.
Rn =
[
r1n
.
.
.
rMnn
]
=
[ r1n,1 ··· ··· r1n,K
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
rMnn,1 ··· ··· rMnn,K
]
. (6)
where the jth row corresponds to application j, while columns
represent different resources. That is, rjn,k is the amount of
resource k that application j ∈ Mn requests from provider
n. When the service provider works alone3, its objective is
to maximize its utility by allocating resources to its native
applications and improving application satisfaction. A service
provider n earns a non-negative monotonically non-decreasing
utility ujn(x
j
n,k) by making allocation decision x
j
n,k, i.e.,
allocating xjn,k amount of resource k to application j ∈Mn,
3Not borrowing from or renting out its resources to any other service
provider.
TABLE I
LIST OF NOTATIONS USED THROUGHOUT THE PAPER
Notation Description
N , N, n Set, number and index of game players (service providers)
K,K, k Set, number and index of resources
M,M, j Set, number and index of applications
Mn Set of native applications at player (provider) n
S A coalition of game players (providers), where S ⊆ N
V Set of payoff vectors
v(S) Value of coalition S
G1 Set of players (providers) with resource deficit
G2 Set of players (providers) with resource surplus
C Capacity vector of all game players (providers)
Cn Capacity vector of player (provider)n
Cn,k Capacity of resource k at player (provider) n
Rn Request matrix at player (provider) n
rjn,k Request of application j for resource k from player
(provider) n
xjn,k Allocation decision of resource k for application j at player
(provider) n
xjn Allocation decision vector for application j at player
(provider) n when working alone
Xn Allocation decision for player (provider) n in the coalition
X Allocation decision for the entire coalition
Xn Allocation decision for player (provider) n in the coalition
excluding its native applications
mXn Allocation decision for applications of player (provider) m
at player (provider) n in the coalition s
ujn(x
j
n,k) Utility player (provider) n earns by allocating resource k to
application j
ujn(x
j
n) Utility player (provider) n earns by allocating vector of
resources to application j
GC Grand coalition
RS Request satisfiability
TU Transferable utility
NTU Non-transferable utility
CGT Cooperative game theory
MOO Multi-objective optimization
SOO Single-objective optimization
MEC Mobile edge cloud
where xjn = [x
j
n,1, x
j
n,2, · · · , xjn,K ]T . Table I summarizes the
notations used throughout the paper. Below we present the
optimization formulation for a single service provider.
A. Problem Formulation for Single Service Provider
We first present the resource allocation problem for a single,
stand-alone provider (i.e., no resource sharing with other
providers). For each provider n ∈ N , the allocation decisions
consist of the vectors x1n, · · · ,xMnn . The optimization problem
is:
max
x1n,··· ,xMnn
∑
j∈Mn
f jn(x
j
n), (7a)
s.t.
∑
j
xjn,k ≤ Cn,k, ∀k ∈ K (7b)
xjn,k ≤ rjn,k, ∀ j ∈Mn, k ∈ K, (7c)
xjn,k ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈Mn, k ∈ K. (7d)
The objective function f jn(x
j
n) is required to be a monotonic,
non-negative and non-decreasing function. For illustration
5purposes in this paper, we assume that:
f jn(x
j
n) = w
j
1u
j
n(x
j
n) +
∑
k∈K
xjn,k
rjn,k
.
where the term
∑
k∈K
xjn,k
rjn,k
captures the request satisfaction
(see Definition 16) and ujn(x
j
n) is the non-decreasing and
non-negative utility the service provider earns by providing
the resources to applications. The weight wj1 is used for
scaling so that both the terms are on the same scale. The
first constraint in (7b) indicates that the allocated resources
cannot exceed capacity. The second constraint in (7c) indicates
that the allocated resources should not exceed the required
amounts. The last constraint, (7d) requires the allocation to be
non-negative.
The goal of this single-objective optimization problem for
every provider, as mentioned earlier, is to maximize its utility
by allocating available resources to its native applications and
improving application satisfaction. We note that this single-
provider formulation does not consider the following. For
example, it is possible that a service provider n may earn a
larger utility by providing its resources to applications of other
service providers. Furthermore, provider(s) may not have suffi-
cient resources to satisfy requests of all its native applications,
while other providers may have resource surpluses that can be
“rented” and utilized by other providers. In this work, we focus
on strategies where each service provider allocates resources to
its native applications and then shares any remaining resources
with other service providers who are not able to fully satisfy
their native applications. These aspects are considered in the
following formulation.
B. Problem Formulation for Multiple Service Providers
Let us assume that a mobile edge service provider n does
not have sufficient resources to satisfy all its native applica-
tions. Suppose that service provider m has a resource surplus,
after allocating its resources to its native applications that
can be shared with n. Allowing resource sharing among such
providers can improve resource utilization and application
satisfaction. By sharing and allocating its type k resources
to application l, service provider m earns a non-decreasing
and non-negative net utility H lm(x
l
m,k), which in this paper is
assumed to be
H lm(x
l
m,k) = w
l
1
(
ulm(z
l
k + x
l
m,k)− ulm(zlk)−Dlm(xlm,k)
)
+
( xlm,k
rln,k − zlk
)2
,∀l ∈M\Mm, n ∈ N\m.
(8)
where zlk =
∑
n∈N\m x
l
n,k is the amount of resource k
allocated already to application l by providers other than m.
ulm(z
l
k + x
l
m,k) − ulm(zlk) captures the incremental increase
in utility of provider m due to the allocation of additional
resource xlm,k. D
j
m(x
j
m,k) represents the communication cost
of serving application j ∈ Mn by using resource of type k
at provider m rather than its native service provider n. We
assume that the communication cost is a positive monotonic
non-decreasing function. The term (
xlm,k
rln,k−zlk
)2, which takes a
value in [0, 1], is used to reduce resource fragmentation by
providing a higher utility for providing more resources at a
particular provider.
To consider each provider and its native applications, let
F jn(x
j
n) represent the utility service provider n earns by
allocating resources to its native applications along with the
increase in request satisfaction due to provision of resources to
its applications at different service providers including itself.
We assume:
F jn(x
j
n) = w
j
1u
j
n(x
j
n) +
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈N x
j
m,k
rjn,k
. (9)
Note that F jn is monotonic non-decreasing and non-negative.
Furthermore, we implicitly assume that ujn(x) = u
j
m(x), x ≥
0. The latter assumption reflects that different providers earn
the same utility when allocating the same amount of resources
of the same type to a given application, either locally or
remotely. Furthermore,
xj = [
∑
n∈N
xjn,1,
∑
n∈N
xjn,2, · · · ,
∑
n∈N
xjn,K ]
T .
That is, the total resources allocated to any application j ∈M
is the sum of resource allocated to it across all service
providers. The resource sharing and allocation framework,
based on resource requests and capacities of service providers,
has to make allocations that optimize the utilities of all the
service providers n ∈ N while satisfying user requests as well.
The allocation decision is given by X = {X1,X2, · · · ,XN},
where Xn, ∀n ∈ N is given by:
Xn =
[
x1n
.
.
.
x|M|n
]
=
[ x1n,1 ··· ··· x1n,K
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
x
|M|
n,1 ··· ··· x|M|n,K
]
. (10)
When service providers share resources, each service
provider aims to maximize the sum of utilities obtained by
a) allocating resources to its native applications; b) allo-
cating resources (if available) to applications of other ser-
vice providers; c) improving the request satisfaction of its
applications by using its own resources or borrowing from
other service providers (when needed and possible); and d)
reducing resource fragmentation. In the resource sharing case,
each service provider allocates its resources by solving the
following optimization problem:
max
Xn
∑
j∈Mn
F jn(x
j
n) +
∑
l∈{M\Mn}
H ln(x
l
n), ∀n ∈ N ,
(11a)
s.t.
∑
j
xjn,k ≤ Cn,k, ∀ j ∈M, k ∈ K, n ∈ N , (11b)∑
m∈N
xjm,k ≤ rjn,k, ∀ j ∈M, k ∈ K, n ∈ N , (11c)
xjn,k ≥ 0, ∀ j ∈M, k ∈ K, n ∈ N , (11d)
6uln(z
l
k + x
l
n,k)− ujn(zlk) ≥ Dln(xln,k),
∀l ∈M\Mn, k ∈ K, n ∈ N , (11e)
where F jn(x
j
n) and H
l
n(x
l
n) are given in (8) and (9). Con-
straints (11b)-(11d) are similar to those for the formulation in
(7), except that (11e) indicates that the utility earned by sharing
resources must be higher than the communication cost.
As the utility ujn, ∀n ∈ N can differ for each application
j, (11) for all providers n represents a multi-objective opti-
mization problem, which will be solved by a game-theoretic
approach as follows.
IV. GAME THEORETIC SOLUTION
In this section, we first present general properties of our
game and show that the resource-sharing problem for multiple
providers can be modeled as a canonical cooperative game
with non-transferable utility. We then show that the core is
non-empty, by proving that our canonical game is cardinally
convex [9]. Finally, we propose algorithms in Section IV-B to
obtain allocations from the core.
A. General Game Properties
We model each service provider as a player in our game
to obtain the optimal resource sharing/allocation decision. Let
N be the set of players that play the resource sharing and
allocation game. The value of coalition for the game players
S ⊆ N is given by, (12), where FS is the feasible set for
resource sharing and allocation given by, (11b)-(11d) andMS
is the set of applications in S,
v(S) =
∑
n∈S
X∈FS
( ∑
j∈Mn
(
wj1u
j
n(x
j
n) +
∑
k∈K
∑
m∈S x
j
m,k
rjn,k
)
+
( ∑
l∈{M\Mn}
wl1
(
uln(z
l + xln)− uln(zl)−Dln(xln)
)
+
∑
k∈K
( xln,k
rlp(l),k − zlk
)2))
. (12)
Here p(l) indicates the native player to which application l
belongs. Our strategy to achieve the aforementioned value of
coalition is that each player first allocates resources to its own
applications and then shares its remaining resources (if any)
with other players.
Remark 2. A resource allocation and sharing problem (with
multiple objectives) for the aforementioned system model can
be modeled as a canonical cooperative game with NTU.
This is so because the stated problem satisfies the following
two conditions.
• Characteristic form of payoff: As the utility function in
our formulated resource sharing and allocation problem
only relies on service providers that are part of the
coalition, the game or payoff function is of characteristic
form.
• Superadditivity: Let S1, S2 ⊆ N where S1, S2 are non-
empty and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. Hence, S1, S2 ⊂ (S1 ∪ S2).
Superadditivity follows from the monotonic utility func-
tions.
Definition 17 (Cardinally Convex Games [9]). An NTU game
is said to be cardinally convex if ∀ S1, S2 ⊆ N :
V(S1) ∪ V(S2) ⊆ V(S1 ∪ S2) ∪ V(S1 ∩ S2). (13)
whereas V is given in definition 3.
Theorem 1. Our canonical game is cardinally convex.
Proof. Let us consider two coalitions S1 and S2 that are non-
empty subsets of N . Then from super-additivity of the game,
V(S1) ∪ V(S2) ⊂ V(S1 ∪ S2). (14)
Furthermore, due to the non-negative and non-decreasing
nature of the utility used,
V(S1 ∪ S2) ⊆ V(S1 ∪ S2) ∪ V(S1 ∩ S2). (15)
The proof follows.
Remark 3. The core of any convex game (N ,V) is non-empty
[10] and large [4].
Remark 4. Our canonical cooperative game (N ,V) with
NTU can be used to obtain the Pareto-optimal solutions for
the multi-objective resource allocation for various service
providers.
The convexity of our game proves that the core is non-
empty. However, obtaining an allocation from the core is
challenging, which we address in the following subsection.
B. Proposed Algorithms
We first propose an efficient algorithm that provides an
allocation from the core. Then, we propose a second algorithm
based on polygamous matching [4] that obtains an allocation
from the core subject to resource fragmentation constraints at
the cost of higher computational complexity when compared
with the first algorithm. Below we discuss these algorithms in
detail.
1) Game-theoretic Pareto Optimal Allocation
We propose a computationally efficient algorithm, Algo-
rithm 1, that obtains a Pareto-optimal allocation by solving
N + |G2| optimization problems, where G2 represents the
set of players with resource surplus. Inputs are available
resources/capacities, application requests and utilities of all
game players. The algorithm outputs an allocation. In Step 1,
utilities of players, the allocation decision, and vectors v, A
and B are initialized. v stores the utility each service provider
achieves when working alone. A stores the utility of players
in G2 whereas B stores the utility increase due to request
satisfaction of applications in resource deficit group G1. Step
2 calculates every player’s utility in the absence of resource
sharing, i.e., the single objective optimization problem in (7)
is solved by every player. To consider the resources allocated
in Step 2, the remaining resource capacities and requests for
various applications C,R are updated and stored in C ′ and
R′, respectively. Step 4 divides players into two groups G1
(resource deficit) and G2 (resource surplus), on the basis of
updated capacities and requests. Step 5 allocates the shared
resources of players in G2 to players in G1. zj denotes the
7total resources allocated to an application j previously in Step
2 and up to the current iteration of Step 5. Up to this point, a
given application j can receive resources from multiple players
due to resource sharing. In step 6, the utility reflecting an
increase in application satisfaction for native applications of
players in G1 is calculated using the allocation obtained in Step
5. Below, we prove that Algorithm 1 provides an allocation
from the core.
Algorithm 1 Game-theoretic Pareto optimal allocation
(GPOA)
Input: R,C, and vector of players’ utility function u
Output: X
Step 1: u(X)←0, X ←0, v ←0, A←0, B ←0, z ←0
Step 2:
for n ∈ N
v({n})←Objective function value of (7)
x1n, · · · ,xMnn ←Allocation decision of (7)
Update zj’s based on the allocation decision of (7)
end for
Step 3: Update C and R based on Step 2
C ′ ← Cupdated, R′ ← Rupdated
Step 4: Divide the players into two subsets G1 and G2
representing players with resource deficit and resource
surplus
Step 5:
for n ∈ G2
Xn = Xn\{x1n, · · · ,xMnn } ← Optimal
allocation decision of (16) ∀m ∈ G1
Ajn ← Utility earned by n ∈ G2 due to
resource allocation Xn
Update zj’s based on Xn
Update C ′ and R′
end for
Step 6:
for m ∈ G1
Bm ← Utility earned by satisfying
users j ∈ Mm due to allocation decision
in Step 5
end for
Theorem 2. The solution obtained from Algorithm 1 lies in
the core.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we need to show that a) utilities
obtained using Algorithm 1 are individually rational and group
rational, and b) no group of players has the incentive to leave
the grand coalition to form another sub-coalition S ⊂ N .
Individual Rationality: (See definition 12) For each player
n ∈ N , v({n}) obtained by solving (7) is the utility a player
obtains by working alone in the absence of resource sharing.
Because the utilities are non-negative, An ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N .
Furthermore utilities of players in G1 may increase due to
increase in request satisfaction if its applications are provided
additional resources by players in G2 given by Bn. Hence
Algorithm 1 produces an individually rational resource allo-
cation.
Group Rationality: The value of the grand coalition v{N}
as per Equation (12) is the sum of different utilities. Steps 2,
5 and 6 of Algorithm 1 obtain the sum of utilities as well.
Hence the solution obtained as a result of Algorithm 1 is group
rational.
Furthermore, due to super-additivity of the game and mono-
tonic non-decreasing nature of the utilities, no group of players
has the incentive to form a smaller coalition. Hence Algorithm
1 provides a solution from the core.
Remark 5. Algorithm 1 is a distributed algorithm. All players
first allocate resources to their native applications and then
update their capacities and requests. The updated requests and
capacities are broadcasted by all players to obtain G1 and G2.
The order to execute Step 5 is chosen based on some criteria
(see details below). Players in G2, after allocating resources,
send the updated requests to other players in G2 that have not
yet executed Step 5.
Remark 6. Any payoff allocation from the core generated by
Algorithm 1 is Pareto-optimal.
Remark 7. The allocation decision obtained using Algorithm
1 always belongs to the core irrespective of the order in which
players execute Step 5.
max
Xn
∑
m∈G1
( ∑
j∈Mm
(
wj1
(
ujn(z
j + xjn)− ujn(zj)−
Djn(x
j
n)
)
+
∑
k∈K
( xjn,k
rjm,k − zjk
)2))
, ∀n ∈ G2 (16a)
s.t.
∑
j
xjn,k ≤ C ′n,k, ∀k ∈ K,∀j ∈Mm,∀m ∈ G1,
(16b)
xjn,k ≤ r
′j
m,k, k ∈ K,∀j ∈Mm,∀m ∈ G1, (16c)
xjn,k ≥ 0, k ∈ K,∀j ∈Mm,∀m ∈ G1, (16d)
ujn(z
j
k + x
j
n,k)− ujn(zjk) ≥ Djn(xjn,k), k ∈ K,
∀j ∈Mm,∀m ∈ G1. (16e)
Based on Remark 7, it is important to note that Algorithm 1
can generate different solutions according to the order in which
players execute Step 5. Some candidate ordering schemes
listed below.
1) Capacity ascending order (CAO): Players in G2 are
arranged in an ascending order on the basis of the
remaining capacities of a resource k, which is then used
for executing Step 5.
2) Capacity descending order (CDO): Players in G2 are
arranged in a descending order on the basis of the
remaining capacities of a resource k, which is then used
for executing Step 5.
3) Random Order: The order in which players execute
Step 5 is random.
While all these variants provide allocations from the core,
finding the most beneficial order for the for-loop in Step
5 requires evaluating all possible combinations of possible
orders for executing the for-loop. Since Algorithm 1 always
provides an allocation from the core, it is desirable to identify
the order of surplus players considered in Step 5 that also
8considers physical constraints such as resource fragmentation
across multiple players (service providers). Toward this goal,
we present below a matching-based resource sharing algorithm
that further reduces resource fragmentation while providing an
allocation from the core.
2) Polyandrous-Polygamous Matching for Resource Shar-
ing
Our proposed algorithm is based on polyandrous polyga-
mous matching [11] that matches players (service providers)
in G1 to G2 with the goal of maximizing utility for players in
G2 and reducing resource fragmentation for supporting native
applications from players in G1. The idea behind our matching
algorithm, inspired from two-sided markets [4], for reducing
resource fragmentation is as follows. Players in G1 have
specific preferences for which players in G2 they would like to
obtain resources from. On the other hand, players in G2 aim to
maximize their utilities. As our framework relies on monotonic
non-decreasing utilities, the objectives of players in G1 and G2
can be mapped to each other, i.e., the more resources players
in G2 share with players in G1, the higher will their utilities be
and the lower the resource fragmentation will be. Therefore,
during each round, resources of one player in G2 are assigned
to applications of a player in G1 that produces the largest
increase in its utility. This means that a G2 player will provide
as many resources as possible (increasing its utility) that in
turn should reduce resource fragmentation for applications in
G1. From resource fragmentation perspective, our scheme will
transform into polygamous/many-to-one matching [4] or stable
marriage/one-to-one matching [12] in the best case scenario.
Below, we discuss the different steps of the algorithm.
In Algorithm 2, all variables are initialized in Step 1.
z is a vector that stores allocations for every application
j ∈ M across different players. In Step 2, all game players
n ∈ N allocate resources to their native applications. Request
matrices and capacity vectors are updated in Step 3, and
players are divided into two groups G1 and G2 in Step 4.
Here A and B records utilities of players in G2 and G1,
respectively. Step 5 is the core of the algorithm. In Step 5a,
Algorithm 3 is used to construct a matching matrix J . The
elements of matching matrix J (m rows and n columns)
are obtained by solving and obtaining the objective function
value of the the problem in (17) for every possible pair of
(m ∈ G1, n ∈ G2). (17) maximizes the incremental utility a
player in G2 earns by sharing its resources with a player in G1,
whereas the second summation term is used to reduce resource
fragmentation. (17b) indicates that the allocated resources
cannot exceed the capacity. (17c) indicates that the allocation
cannot be more than the required resources. (17d) shows that
the allocation decision is non-negative whereas (17e) indicates
that the incremental increase in utility cannot be less than the
communication cost.
Algorithm 3 also provides total amount of resources used for
each element of J and allocation decision mXn that captures
how resources are allocated to all applications j ∈ Mm
for m ∈ G1 at player n ∈ G2. In 5b, the largest element
in J , given by Jm,n, is used to match m to n, i.e., the
player n (with resource surpluses) shares its resources with
the player m (with resource deficits). If there are multiple
maximum values, then the one that uses smallest number of
resources is used to choose the matching. In 5c, applications
j ∈ Mm are assigned to n ∈ G2. In 5d, An is updated with
the utility of player n ∈ G2 based on the assignment in 5c.
Similarly, Bm,Xn and zj are updated to reflect the increase in
application satisfaction, resources allocated by n to different
applications and resources allocated to j ∈Mm, respectively.
Requests and capacities are updated in 5e whereas 5f updates
elements of G1 and G2 if required.
Definition 18. Objection to a matching [4]: A player m ∈ G1
and n ∈ G2 object to a matching M if they both prefer being
matched to each other than to whom they are matched by M .
Definition 19. Stable matching [4]: A matching M is stable
if there is no pair m ∈ G1 and n ∈ G2 that objects to a
matching.
Theorem 3. The polyandrous-polygamous matching in Algo-
rithm 2 is stable.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Assume that the match-
ing M obtained from Algorithm 2 is not stable and there exists
a pair (m ∈ G1, n ∈ G2) that objects to the matching. M has
originally matched m ∈ G1 to n′ and n ∈ G2 to m′. The
objection by n means that it can achieve a higher utility by
being matched with m when compared with the current match
m′ ∈ G1. However, this is not possible as m′ was matched with
n based on the maximization problem given in (17), i.e., m′
provides the highest utility to n for its resources. Hence, our
assumption is wrong and the matching is stable.
Remark 8. Algorithm 2 provides an allocation from the core.
Remark 9. The optimization problems in (7), (16) and (17)
are non-convex. The hardness of these problems depend on
the parameters such as the utility functions, requests and
capacities. Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate the hardness
of these problems, but the instances we consider in Section
V are easily solved using existing solvers. In general, certain
non-convex optimization problems can usually be solved to
optimality by proving that the strong duality holds [8], and
then solving the convex dual of these non-convex problems.
Detailed discussions on strong duality can be found in [8]
whereas [13] presents the necessary and sufficient conditions
for strong duality of non-convex problems. If the optimal
solutions are not found for (7), (16) or (17), then the allocation
will not be from the core.
max
mXn
∑
j∈Mm
(
wj1
(
ujn(z
j + xjn)− ujn(zj)−Djn(xjn)
)
+
∑
k∈K
( xjn,k
rjm,k − zjk
)2)
, (17a)
s.t.
∑
j
xjn,k ≤ C ′n,k, ∀k ∈ K,∀j ∈Mm, (17b)
xjn,k ≤ r
′j
m,k, k ∈ K,∀j ∈Mm, (17c)
xjn,k ≥ 0, k ∈ K,∀j ∈Mm (17d)
9Algorithm 2 Polyandrous-Polygamous Matching based Pareto
Optimal Allocation (PPMPOA)
Input: R,C, and vector of players’ utility function u
Output: X, u(X)
Step 1: u(X) ← 0, X ← 0, v ← 0, [J ]|G1|×|G2| ←
0, z ← 0
Step 2:
for n ∈ N
v({n}) ←Objective function value from
Equation (7)
x1n, · · · ,xMnn ←Allocation decision from
(7)
Update zj’s based on the allocation decision of (7)
end for
Step 3: Update C and R based on Step 2
C ′ ← Cupdated, R′ ← Rupdated
Step 4: Divide the players into two subsets G1 and
G2 representing players with resource deficit and
resource surplus
A← 0, B ← 0
Step 5:
while G1 6= ∅ || G2 6= ∅
Step 5a: [J ]|G1|×|G2| ← Algorithm 3 for constructing
matching matrix
Step 5b:
if Multiple maximum values in [J ]
Choose one with the lowest Rm,n
else
Obtain the row m and column n of the maximum
value in [J ]
end if
Step 5c: Assign all j ∈Mm,m ∈ G1 to n ∈ G2
Step 5d: Update An,Bm,Xn and zj using the pre-
ceding assignment
Step 5e: Update Cn and Rm
Step 5f :
if Cn = 0,
G2 = G2\n
end if
if Rm = 0,
G1 = G1\m
end if
end while
ujn(z
j
k + x
j
n,k)− ujn(zjk) ≥ Djn(xjn,k), k ∈ K,
∀j ∈Mm. (17e)
Lemma 1. Our resource sharing framework improves request
satisfaction.
Proof. Let the average application request satisfaction for the
non-resource sharing case be given by RSn,1, where RSn,1
is obtained following the resource allocation decision in Step
2 of Algorithms 1 and 2, ∀n ∈ N . As players in G2 share
their resources with players in G1, average user satisfaction as
a result of the allocation, given by RSn,2 is also positive, i.e.,
> 0. Hence, user satisfaction achieved using our framework is
given by RSn = RSn,1 +RSn,2, where RSn ≥ RSn,1.
C. Strategy-Proof Incentive
In this section, we answer the question: Is there an incentive
for a single player or group of players to cheat and report
incorrect capacities and application requests to other players?
That is, will misreporting the capacities or application requests
improve the payoff a player or group of players receive? The
answer is no as given by the following Theorem.
Theorem 4. When the service providers use Algorithms 1 and
2 for resource sharing and allocation, no player or group of
players has any incentive to cheat and misreport capacities
and application requests, i.e., each player n ∈ N can achieve
the highest payoff by truthfully reporting its capacity and
requests.
Proof. Assume a player n ∈ N improves its utility Un by
misreporting its capacity and application requests, i.e., U ′n >
Un where U ′n is the utility obtained by cheating and Un is
the utility obtained by truthful reporting. Each player receives
its payoff for providing resources to its own applications first
and then sharing the remaining resources (if any) with the
applications of other service providers. Player payoff improves
once resources are provided and user requests are satisfied.
Algorithm 3 Constructing matching matrix J
Input: R,C, u, z
Output: J ,R,mXn
for n ∈ G2
for m ∈ G1
Jm,n ← Payoff for allocation
decision from (17)
Rm,n ← Resources allocated in (17)
end for
end for
The larger the amount of resources provided and requests
satisfied, the higher the obtained payoff will be. There are two
cases for cheating:
• Under-reporting4 the capacity and application re-
quests: In this case, the player will not receive the payoff
possible by satisfying its applications and fully utilizing
its capacity by allocating resources to its own applications
and applications of other players. This contradicts the
assumption that U ′n > Un. Hence, the player has no
incentive to under-report its capacity and application
requests.
• Over-reporting5 the capacity and application requests:
Since the payoff depends on the actual amount of re-
sources provided and requests satisfied rather than the
reported capacity and application requests, the highest
payoff possible for the player is Un contradicting our
assumption that U ′n > Un.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of proposed resource sharing
and allocation framework for several parameter settings as
4Reporting a lower value than the actual value.
5Reporting a larger value than the actual value.
10
3P-3A
Alone GC1 GC2
0
10
20
30
40
Ut
ili
ty
 a
ch
ie
ve
d
MEC 1 MEC 2 MEC 3
3P-3A
Alone GC1 GC2
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
R
es
ou
rc
e 
ut
ili
za
tio
n MEC 1 MEC 2 MEC 3
3P-3A
Alone GC1 GC2
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Us
er
 s
at
is
fa
ct
io
n
MEC 1 MEC 2 MEC 3
Fig. 3. Performance of our framework with Algorithm 1 for 3 player - 3 application settings.
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Fig. 4. Performance of our framework with Algorithm 1 for 3 player - 20 application settings.
TABLE II
SIMULATION NETWORK SETTINGS.
Setting Parameters G1 G2
1 N = 3,Mn = 3, ∀n ∈ N {1} {2, 3}
2 N = 3,Mn = 20, ∀n ∈ N {1} {2, 3}
3 N = 6,Mn = 6, ∀n ∈ N {1, 2, 3} {4, 5, 6}
4 N = 6,Mn = 20, ∀n ∈ N {1, 2, 5} {3, 4, 6}
shown in Table II, where G1 and G2 represent the set of service
providers with resource deficits and surpluses respectively.
Each player has three different types of resources (K = 3),
i.e., storage, communication and computation. Without loss of
generality, the model can be extended to include other types
of resources. We use linear and sigmoidal utilities for all the
players given below.
ujn(x
j
n,k) = ax
j
n,k + c (18)
ujn(x
j
n,k) =
1
1 + e−µ(x
j
n,k−rjn,k)
(19)
µ is chosen to be 0.01 whereas the constants a and c were
randomly generated. Requests Rn and capacities Cn,∀n ∈ N
are randomly generated for each setting within a pre-specified
range. To show the advantage of resource sharing, we allocate
larger capacities to certain players that share available re-
sources with other domains and assist other players in meeting
demand in order to increase their utilities.
Simulations were run in Matlab R2019b on a Core-i7
processor with 16 GB RAM. To solve the optimization prob-
lems, we used the OPTI-toolbox [14]. Below, we provide
detailed experimental results for both algorithms.
A. Results for Algorithm 1
1) Verification of game-theoretic properties
In Table III, we present results for a 3-player 20-application
game that verify different game theoretic properties such as
individually rationality, group rationality, super additivity and
show that the obtained allocation lies in the core. Player 1
has a resource deficit while players 2 and 3 have resource
surpluses. The payoffs all players receive in the grand coalition
are at least as good as they would receive working alone. This
shows that the solution obtained using Algorithm 1 for the
grand coalition is individually rational. Similarly, the value of
coalition is the sum of payoff all players receive, hence our
solution is group rational. Furthermore, as the coalition size
increases, coalition value increases. Hence, the grand coalition
has the largest value, which shows the super additive nature of
the game. Also, no set of players has any incentive to divert
from the grand coalition and form a smaller coalition. Hence,
the grand coalition is stable and the allocation we obtain using
Algorithm 1 lies in the core. There are two different results for
the grand coalition, i.e., GC1 or {1, 2, 3} and GC2 or {1, 3, 2}
which shows that changing the order of for-loop in Step 5
of Algorithm 1 only changes the utility achieved by players in
G2. However, btoh allocations lie in the core. Similar results
are seen for other settings given in Table II, and hence are
omitted here due to space constraints. For {1, 2, 3}, player 2
precedes player 3 in Step 5 (of Algorithm 1) while player 3
precedes player 2 in Step 5 for the grand coalition in {1, 3, 2}.
From the results, it is evident that having player 2 execute Step
5 in Algorithm 1 before player 3 is preferable to the order
player 3 before player 2. However, it is impossible to know
that in advance and we need to try all possible combinations.
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Fig. 5. Performance of our framework with Algorithm 1 for 6 player - 6 application settings.
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Fig. 6. Performance of our framework with Algorithm 1 for 6 player - 20 application settings.
TABLE III
PLAYER PAYOFF IN DIFFERENT COALITIONS FOR A 3 PLAYER - 20
APPLICATION GAME
Coalition Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Value of coalition
{1} 108.74 0.00 0.00 108.74
{2} 0 120 0 120
{3} 0 0 120 120
{1, 2} 111.51 131.01 0 242.52
{1, 3} 112.04 0 130.75 242.79
{2, 3} 0 120 120 240
{1, 2, 3}1 114.39 131.01 122.75 368.15
{1, 3, 2}2 114.39 120 130.75 365.14
2) Efficacy of the resource sharing framework
Figures 3 and 4 show the efficacy of our resource sharing
framework using Algorithm 1 and compare it with a setting
in which the MECs are working alone for the 3 players and
different application settings given in Table II. We evaluate
the impact of the proposed framework on MEC utility, request
satisfaction, and resource utilization. It is evident that MECs
with resource deficits are able to improve their application
satisfaction and utilities (due to increase in application satis-
faction) whereas MECs with resource surpluses improve their
utilities by sharing their resources, which in turn increases
resource utilization. For GC1 results in the 6 player-6 appli-
cation setting, player 4 and 5 precede player 6 in Step 5 of
Algorithm 1 whereas in GC2, player 6 precedes players 4
and 5. For GC1 results in the 6 player-20 application setting,
players 3 and 4 precede player 6 whereas in GC2, player
6 precedes players 3 and 4 in step 5 of Algorithm 1. The
utility function distributions among players vary for GC1 and
GC2, however, both allocations are in the core and are Pareto
optimal. Figures 5 and 6 show the performance of Algorithm
1 in the 6 player, 6 and 20 application settings, respectively.
It is evident from the results that resource sharing improves
utility of MECs with resource surplus and user satisfaction of
resource deficit MECs.
B. Results for Algorithm 2
Figure 7 presents the results for Algorithm 2. It is evident
that Algorithm 2 improves the utilities and application sat-
isfaction of different MECs (compared with MECs working
alone). To highlight the decrease in resource fragmentation
due to Algorithm 2, we compare it with Algorithm 1. Figure
8 shows the percentage of resources allocated to applications
of different MECs in G1 by MECs in G2 using Algorithms
1 and 2. Using Algorithm 1 for resource sharing in the 6
player 6 application setting (GC1), applications of MEC 1
are allocated resources at MEC 4 and 6, whereas applications
of both MEC 2 and MEC 3 receive resources from MECs 4,
5, 6. For the same setting and using Algorithm 2, resources
to applications of MEC 1 are provided by MEC 4 and 6. Re-
sources to applications of MEC 2 and 3 are provided by MEC
4 and 5, respectively. This shows that resources fragmentation
significantly reduces by Algorithm 2 when compared with
Algorithm 1 at the cost of added computational complexity.
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Fig. 8. Resource fragmentation for Algorithms 1 and 2 in 6 player-6
application setting.
The experimental results show that the proposed resource
sharing framework can benefit MECs. While Algorithm 1 is
computationally more efficient, it may result in comparatively
larger resource fragmentation. On the other hand, Algorithm
2 reduces resource fragmentation at the cost of computational
complexity.
VI. RELATED WORK
There have been a number of solutions proposed in the
literature related to resource allocation in edge computing
[1], [15]–[22]. Xu et al. [18] propose a novel model for
allocating resources in an edge computing setting where the
allocation of distributed edge resources is decoupled from
service provisioning management at the service provider side.
The authors develop an auction-based resource sharing con-
tract establishment and resource allocation that maximizes the
utilities of service providers and edge computing infrastructure
providers. He et al. [1] relax the long-held assumption that
storage resources are not shareable and study the optimal
allocation of both shareable and non-shareable resources in
a mobile edge computing setting. The authors consider the
joint problem of service placement and request scheduling,
and propose constant-factor approximation algorithm as the
problem is proven to be NP-hard. Liu et al. [21] model the
interaction among cloud service operators and edge service
owners as a Stackelberg game for maximizing the utilities of
both cloud and edge service providers. The authors obtain the
optimal payment along with the computation offloading strate-
gies. Zhang et al. [19] propose an optimization framework,
formulated as a Stackelberg equilibrium, for edge nodes, data
service operators and service subscribers that provides optimal
resource allocation in a distributed manner. Xu et al. [20]
propose a secure caching scheme in heterogeneous networks
for multi-homed subscribers that relies on a trust mechanism
for verifying the reliability of edge computing-enabled small
cell base stations. The authors also propose a Chinese reminder
theorem based protocol for preserving privacy. A Stackelberg
game is used to model the interaction between the mobile
users and the edge cloud and the goal is to maximize utilities
of both users and service providers.
Our work in this paper differs from [1], [18]–[21] as we
consider objectives of different service providers and allow
resource sharing among edge cloud service providers. In [23],
we consider the strategy where the players do not differentiate
between their own applications and applications of other
players, and propose a centralized algorithm that provides an
allocation from the core. This work is an extension of our
earlier work in [22], where we model the resource sharing
among mobile edge clouds as a canonical cooperative game
with transferable utility (TU). However, in this work, we
model the problem as an NTU game which is more generic
than the TU game [6]. Unlike [22], we do not rely on
Shapley value, due to high complexity for obtaining a solution.
Furthermore, we have not included application satisfaction and
resource fragmentation as part of the resource sharing game
in [22].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a cooperative game theory
based resource sharing and allocation framework for edge
clouds. We showed that for monotonic, non-decreasing and
non-negative positive utilities, resource sharing among edge
clouds can be modeled as a cardinally convex canonical
game. We have proved that the core exists and proposed
two efficient algorithms that provide allocation from the core.
Hence, the obtained solutions are Pareto optimal and the grand
coalition of the edge service providers is stable. Furthermore,
we have reduced resource fragmentation using the matching
based algorithm that also provides an allocation in the core.
Experimental results show that utilities of all service providers
and user satisfaction are improved, when compared with edge
clouds working alone, using our framework.
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